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Abstract. Private itemset support counting (PISC) is a basic building block
of various privacy-preserving data mining algorithms. Brieﬂy, in PISC, Client
wants to know the support of her itemset in Server’s database with the
usual privacy guarantees. First, we show that if the number of attributes is
small, then a communication-efﬁcient PISC protocol can be constructed from a
communication-efﬁcient oblivious transfer protocol. The converse is also true:
any communication-efﬁcient PISC protocol gives rise to a communication-
efﬁcient oblivious transfer protocol. Second, for the general case, we propose
a computationally efﬁcient PISC protocol with linear communication in the size
of the database. Third, we show how to further reduce the communication by
using various tradeoffs and random sampling techniques.
Keywords: privacy-preserving data mining, private frequent itemset mining, pri-
vate itemset support counting, private subset inclusion test.
1 Introduction
Frequent itemset mining—also known as frequent pattern mining—is a central task in
data mining that has driven research in data mining for ten years. Nowadays, there are
special workshops on various aspects of frequent itemset mining [BGZ04]. The goal in
frequent itemset mining is to ﬁnd all frequent itemsets in a given transaction database.
Many kinds of data can be viewed as transaction databases and various data mining
tasks arising in document analysis, web mining, computational biology, software engi-
neering and so on can be modelled as frequent itemset mining. For example, one can use
frequent itemset mining to ﬁnd which items are usually bought together in a supermar-
ket, or to analyse the correlation between various patterns in the genome database. The
mining of frequent itemsets is a very challenging problem, and it is clearly even more
challenging in the scenarios when one encounters privacy issues. Several researchers
have studied the distributed case with multiple servers, all having a part of the database,
who need to mine frequent itemsets in the joint database without revealing each other
too much extra information.
Weareconcernedwithaslightlydifferentscenariowherethedatabaseisownedbya
single party, Server, who sells the result of frequent itemset mining (either the collection
of all frequent itemsets or the support of a ﬁxed itemset) to others. That is, we consider
the itemset support counting (ISC) problem, which is often used as a building block of
frequent itemset mining or association rules mining, but is important also by itself. Asan example of ISC, Server could maintain a commercial citation database, and Client
could want to ﬁnd out how many people cite both herself and Shannon. Other possible
examples include Internet search engines, mining in medical databases, etc. In most
of such applications, some form of privacy must be guaranteed. On the one hand, it
is not in Server’s interests that Client obtains more information than she has paid for;
moreover, in some cases like the medical databases, giving out more information might
even be illegal. On the other hand, Client also does not necessarily want Server to know
which itemset interests her.
To deﬁne the private itemset support counting, let us ﬁrst describe the setting more
formally. Server owns a m×n Boolean database D that can be considered as a multiset
of m subsets of the set [n] = {1,...,n}. Every row is D is called a transaction; it might
correspond to a transaction in supermarket, with j ∈ D[i] if jth item was purchased
during the ith transaction. A subset of [n] is called an itemset, it corresponds to the
set of items that can be in the ith transaction (e.g., the set of items that were bought
together). The goal of Client is to determine the support suppD(Q) := |{i : Q ⊆ D[i]}|
of an itemset Q ⊆ [n] in D, i.e., to ﬁnd out how many of Server’s transactions contain
Q. In an (m × n)-private itemset support counting (PISC) protocol, Client retrieves
suppD(Q), so that (1) she will get no other information about the database D (server-
privacy) and (2) Server gets no information about Q (client-privacy). In the scope of
this paper, we require server-privacy to be information-theoretical and client-privacy to
be computational.
The data mining setting implies a few non-standard considerations, mostly due to
the large amounts of the handled data. First, m and n can be very large (e.g., m,n ≥
10000), so whenever possible, it is desirable to have communication and computation
of order o(mn). Second, again due to the large amount of data, it is impractical to
have protocols that are veriﬁable or even provide correctness. Therefore, we only focus
on the privacy issues of the PISC protocols. Thus, we use relaxed security deﬁnitions,
standard in the case of computationally-private information retrieval, oblivious transfer
and oblivious keyword search protocols, where the security of the client is only deﬁned
by requiring that his query will remain private. Moreover, we construct protocols that
are private in the semi-honest model since they are usually efﬁcient and may sufﬁce in
the practice. Protocols, private in the malicious model, can be constructed by adding
standard zero-knowledge proofs. In all cases, we put emphasis both on the efﬁciency of
the protocols and on the provable security.
First, we show a close correspondence between PISC and CPIR by providing tight
two-way reductions between these two problems. More precisely: (a) Given a
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protocol CPIR of `-bit strings with communication CCPIR(s,`), we show how to con-
struct a (2n ×n)-PISC protocol CPIR-PISC with communication CCPIR(2n,n). Taking
the recent
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-oblivious transfer protocol for `-bit strings of Lipmaa [Lip05] with com-
munication Θ(log
2 s + ` · logs), this results in communication Θ(n2). (The use of a
very recent CPIR protocol by Gentry and Ramzan [GR05] results in communication
Θ(n).) However, in the case of CPIR-PISC, Server needs to store a table of 2n · n
bits and then execute the CPIR protocol on 2n elements, which is infeasible when say
n ≥ 20, while in a realistic data mining application, n might be larger than 10000. (b)
Given a (m×n)-PISC protocol PISC with communication CPISC(m,n), we show howto construct a
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-CPIR protocol PISC-CPIR on 1-bit strings with communication
CPISC(2n,n). This enables us to carry over several standard results on the CPIR and
oblivious transfer protocols to the PISC scenario. Moreover, the reductions increase
communication at most by factor of n, therefore the optimal communication of the
CPIR and PISC protocols can differ only by a logarithmic term in the database size.
For databases with many attributes, we describe an alternative (m × n)-PISC pro-
tocol PSI-PISC that uses a new private subset inclusion protocol PSI, also described in
this paper, as a subroutine. The resulting protocol has communication (n + m + 1) · k,
where k is the bit-length of a ciphertext, and is private in the semi-honest model as-
suming that the used homomorphic cryptosystem (a) has plaintext space with prime
cardinality, and (b) is IND-CPA secure; the Decisional Difﬁe-Hellman Assumption is
sufﬁcient here. The protocol can be made secure in the malicious model by using stan-
dard (non-interactive) zero-knowledge proofs. The PSI-PISC protocol is computation-
ally feasible even when n ≈ 10000, since the computational work of Server is of order
Θ(n + m + w(D)) encryptions and decryptions, where w(D) is the number of 1-bits
in the usually very sparse database D.
In addition, we study imprecise protocols: we discuss the problem of just detecting
whether the given itemset is frequent and study sampling techniques. Random sampling
of the database and approximating the itemset support based on the support in the sam-
ple allows us to cheaply extend the PSI-PISC protocol to huge databases, supposing
that Client is willing to accept approximate answers.
2 Preliminaries
For an integer s, denote [s] := {1,2,...,s}. For a nonnegative integer X, let len(X) :=
dlog2(X + 1)e denote the number of bits it takes to store and transfer X. The statisti-
cal difference of two distributions X and Y over the discrete support Z is deﬁned as
Dist(X||Y ) := maxS⊆Z |Pr[X ∈ S] − Pr[Y ∈ S]|.
Data mining setting. Our setting is the following, very common one in data mining.
The Server has a transaction database D over n attributes (or items) A1,A2,...,An
and the database consists of m transactions. A transaction is a subset of the attributes.
Alternatively, a transaction database D of m transactions over n attributes can be con-
sidered as a m × n binary matrix D where the entry (i,j) is one iff Aj ∈ D[i]. In a
realistic setting, the resulting 0-1 matrix can have e.g. 100000 transactions (rows) and
50000 attributes (columns).
The frequent itemset mining task is, given a transaction database D of m
rows and a minimum frequency threshold σ ∈ (0,1], to ﬁnd the subsets of at-
tributes that are contained in σ-fraction of the transactions, i.e., to determine the
collection F = {X ⊆ {A1,...,An} : freqD(X) ≥ σ} of σ-frequent itemsets in
D where freqD(X) = |{i ∈ [m] : X ⊆ D[i]}|/m = suppD(X)/m. Alternatively,
the set of frequent itemsets can be speciﬁed by the support threshold as F =
{X ⊆ {A1,...,An} : suppD(X) ≥ σ · m}. Usually also the frequencies or the sup-
ports of the frequent itemsets are required. We assume that attribute labels A1,...,An
are public and thus can be substituted with canonical labelling {1,...,n}.Although frequent itemset mining can be done in time O(mnκ) [AMS+96], where
κ is the number of frequent itemsets, the running time can easily become intractable,
since κ itself is exponential in the cardinality of the largest frequent itemset due to
the monotonicity of the support. Therefore, various output compaction techniques are
known from the literature, see [BGZ04] for an up-to-date overview of frequent itemset
mining algorithms and references.
Sampling bounds. Let X1,...,Xk be independent random 0-1 variables that are
drawn from the same distribution with the expectation µ = Pr[Xi = 1]. Let X be the
average(X1+···+Xk)/k.ThentheChernoffboundPr[(1 − ε)µ ≤ X ≤ (1 + ε)µ] ≤
2 · exp
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describes the distribution of relative error and the Hoeffding bound
Pr[|X − µ| ≥ ε] ≤ 2 · exp
 
−2kε2
the distribution of absolute error.
IND-CPA secure homomorphic cryptosystems. A public-key cryptosystem is a triple
Π = (G,E,D), where G is the key generation algorithm that returns (sk,pk) consist-
ing of a secret key sk and a public key pk, E is the encryption algorithm and D is the
decryption algorithm. For a ﬁxed public-key cryptosystem Π and a secret key sk, let C
be the ciphertext space, let R be the randomness space and let P be the plaintext space.
Then, Epk : P × R → C and Dsk : C → P. Deﬁne Adv
indcpa
Π (A) := 2 · |Pr[(sk,pk) ←
G,(m0,m1) ← A(pk),b ← {0,1} : A(m0,m1,Epk(mb;R)) = b] − 1
2|. We say that
Π is (τ,ε)-secure in the sense of IND-CPA if Adv
indcpa
Π (A) ≤ ε for any probabilistic
algorithm A that works in time τ.
Cryptosystem Π is homomorphic if for any key pair (sk,pk), any m,m0 ∈ P and
any r,r0 ∈ R, Epk(m;r)·Epk(m0;r0) = Epk(m+m0;r◦r0), where + is a group oper-
ation in P, and ◦ is a groupoid operation in R. A few homomorphic cryptosystems are
proven to be secure in the sense of IND-CPA under reasonable complexity assumptions.
Deﬁnitions of Client and Server privacy. Assume that Client and Server want to se-
curely compute a functionality f, so that Client receives f(Q,D) and Server receives
nothing, where Q is Client’s private input and D is Server’s private input. In our case,
Server’s input is potentially so huge that all currently known cryptographic techniques
fail to provide correctness in tractable time. Therefore, we consider only privacy issues,
i.e., we use relaxed security deﬁnitions. Thus, we do not require Server to commit to
or even “know” a database to which Client’s search is effectively applied. Such a relax-
ation is standard in the case of protocols like oblivious transfer, computationally-private
information retrieval and oblivious keyword search; our security deﬁnitions correspond
closely to the formalisation given in [FIPR05]. Moreover, in a semi-honest case, all
proposed protocols have two messages and therefore, standard security deﬁnitions can
be somewhat simpliﬁed.
Denote by Client an honest Client and by Server an honest Server. Let Clientsk(·;·)
denote Client’s (ﬁrst) message and Serverpk(·;·) denote Server’s (second) message.
Let RClient (resp. RServer) be the randomness space of an honest Client (resp. Server).
Then we say that a two-message protocol Π is (τ,ε)-client-private (in the malicious
model), if for any probabilistic algorithm A with the working time τ, Adv
c−privacy
Π (A) :=
2 · max(Q0,Q1)

Pr[b ← {0,1} : A(Q0,Q1,Client(Qb;RClient)) = b] − 1
2

 ≤ ε. Here,Q0 and Q1 are assumed to be valid client-side inputs, and the probability is taken over
the coin tosses of Client, A and over the choices of b.
We deﬁne information-theoretical server-privacy in the semihonest model by re-
quiring that for every unbounded honest-but-curious algorithm A, one can deﬁne a
simulator Sim that, given solely A’s private input Q, A’s random coins r, and A’s
private output f(Q,D), generates output that is statistically indistinguishable from the
view (msg1,msg2) of A that reacts with the honest Server, where msg1 ← A(Q;r)
and msg2 ← Server(D,msg1;RServer). More precisely, the advantage of A is deﬁned
Adv
s−privacy
Π (A) := max(Q,D) Dist(Simpk(Q,r,f(Q,D))||(msg1,msg2)). Here, D is as-
sumed to be a valid Server-side input. Protocol is ε-server-private (in the semihonest
model), if for all unbounded honest-but-curious A, Adv
s−privacy
Π (A) < ε. Security in the
malicious model is deﬁned as usually.
Computationally-private information retrieval (CPIR) and oblivious transfer
(OT). During a single-server
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-computationally-private information retrieval pro-
tocol, Client fetches D[Q] from the database D = (D[1],...,D[m]), D[i] ∈ Z` for
some ﬁxed domain Z`, so that a computationally bounded Server does not know which
entry Client is learning. In the case of a two-message CPIR protocol, we can used
the previously previously given client-privacy deﬁnition. An (τ,ε)-client-private
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CPIR is an (computationally) (τ,ε)-client-private and (information-theoretically) ε0-
server-private
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-OT protocol if it is additionally ε0-server-private. A recent
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-
CPIR protocol by Lipmaa [Lip05],
 m
1

-LipmaaCPIR, has asymptotic communication
Θ(log
2 m + logm · `) (assuming that the security parameter is a constant). Based on
the Aiello-Ishai-Reingold CPIR-to-OT transform [AIR01], Lipmaa also described an  m
1
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-OT protocol with the same asymptotic communication. Lipmaa’s protocols are
client-private assuming that the underlying Damg˚ ard-Jurik homomorphic cryptosystem
is IND-CPA secure, or equivalently, if the Decisional Composite Residuosity Problem
is hard. Lipmaa’s protocols are unconditionally server-private. A very recent
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-CPIR
protocol by Gentry and Ramzan [GR05] has communication Θ(logm + `).
Private Keyword Search. In many data-mining applications, the data is indexed by
a relatively small subset of keys K ⊆ {1,...,m}, where the set K itself is private.
Therefore, if a Client wants to privately access D[Q] the straightforward solution, a  m
1
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-OT to the database where empty slots are ﬁlled with dummy elements is subopti-
mal. Several solutions that improve communication and computation costs in this situ-
ation [CGN97,OK04,FIPR05] have been proposed. Such solutions either combine hash
tables and oblivious transfer, or use oblivious evaluation of pseudo-random functions.
3 Basic Cryptographic Tool: Private Subset Inclusion Protocol
In a private subset inclusion (PSI) protocol, Client has a set Q ⊆ [n], Server has a
set S ⊆ [n], and Client must establish whether Q ⊆ S or not without neither of the
parties obtaining any additional information. More precisely, the protocols must satisfy
client-privacy and server-privacy as formalised in Sect. 2, where for the ease of imple-
mentation we deﬁne f(Q,S) = 0, if Q ⊆ S, and f(Q,S) 6= 0, otherwise. We use the
fact that Q ⊆ S ⇐⇒ |Q ∩ S| = |S|. Let Q (resp. S) also denote the characteristic
function of Q (resp. S). That is, Q[i] = 1 ⇐⇒ i ∈ Q and S[i] = 1 ⇐⇒ i ∈ S.PRIVATE INPUT: Client has a set Q and Server has a set S.
PRIVATE OUTPUT: Client knows whether Q ⊆ S or not.
Message 1, Client Generate a new key pair (sk,pk) ← G. Send pk to Server.
For any i ∈ [n], generate a new nonce ri ←r R. Send ci ← Epk(Q[i];ri) to Server.
Message 2, Server Draw s ←r P, r ←r R uniformly at random. Set c ← (
Q
i:S[i]=0 ci)
s ·
Epk(0;r). Send c to Client.
Post-processing by Client Set t ← Dsk(c). Accept that Q ⊆ S iff t = 0.
Protocol 1: Private homomorphic subset inclusion test protocol
To solve PSI, we could use a recent private set intersection cardinality protocol
by Freedman, Nissim and Pinkas [FNP04]. However, their solution requires a costly
secure-circuit evaluation since the intersection cardinality must remain private. Proto-
col 1, based on ideas from [AIR01,Lip03], is a conceptually simpler and more efﬁcient
alternative, especially when security either in the malicious model is required or the
protocol is used in the context of itemset counting as later in Protocol 3. Here, we ex-
plicitly assume that the plaintext length is at least len(n) bits, where n ≥ |Q ∪ S| is the
a priori ﬁxed domain size. This assumption is always true in practice.
Theorem 1. Let Π be a (τ,ε) IND-CPA secure homomorphic cryptosystem and let n
be smaller than any prime divisor of |P|. Then Protocol 1 is (τ − O(n),nε)-client-
private and 0-server-private in the semi-honest model. Protocol 1 is correct with prob-
ability 1 − |P|
−1.
Proof. First, Q ⊆ S iff w :=
P
i:S[i]=0 Q[i] = 0. Therefore, homomorphic proper-
ties of Π assure that c is a random encryption of zero, if Q ⊆ S. If Q 6⊆ S, then
w ≤ |Q| ≤ n is not a divisor of |P| and thus c is a random encryption of a random
plaintext. Consequently, the probability that Q 6⊆ S if c is an encryption of zero is
|P|
−1. Computational client-privacy follows directly from the IND-CPA security of Π.
As Server sees only n ciphertexts, any adversary A that can distinguish two vectors
of ciphertexts can be used for distinguishing only two ciphertexts. The corresponding
hybrid argument is fairly standard. Server-privacy is guaranteed as the second message
depends only on whether Q ⊆ S or not. u t
Security in the malicious model. A standard way to make the described protocol private
in the malicious model is to let Client to prove the correctness of her actions; that means
proving that (a) pk is a valid public key and that (b) every ci encrypts either 0 or 1.
This can be done by using (non-interactive) zero-knowledge or non-interactive zero-
knowledge proofs of knowledge.
4 Exact Private Itemset Support Counting Protocols
Let Q ⊆ [n] be Client’s query, D be the database and m be the number of the rows in the
database; that is, D[i] ⊆ [n] for i ∈ [m]. More precisely, we treat Q as a binary n-tuplecorresponding to the characteristic function of Client’s input and D as an m×n binary
matrix. Recall that in a PISC protocol, Client has to compute, in a privacy-preserving
manner, the value suppD(Q) := |{i : Q ⊆ D[i]}|.
4.1 Relation Between PISC and CPIR
We ﬁrst show that there are tight reductions between oblivious transfer and PISC pro-
tocols even if n is relatively small. For precise quantiﬁcation, denote by CCPIR(s,`) the
communication of a
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-computationally private information retrieval protocolCPIRon
`-bit strings. Similarly, let us denote by CPISC(m,n) the communication of an (m×n)-
PISC protocol PISC.
Theorem 2. (a) Let CPIR be a
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n
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-computationally private information retrieval pro-
tocol on `-bit strings. Assume that len(m) ≤ `. Then there exists a client-private
(m × n)-PISC protocol CPIR-PISC with communication CCPIR(2n,`). Server has to
pre-compute and store a table of 2n · len(m) bits; this table can be computed in time
Θ(2n · m) ignoring logarithmically-small multiplicands.
(b) Let PISC be a client-private (2n × n)-PISC protocol. Then there exists a
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-
CPIR protocol PISC-CPIR on 1-bit strings with communication CPISC(2n,n). Server
has to pre-compute and store a table of ≤ 2n·n bits; this table can be computed in time
Θ(22n · 2n) ignoring logarithmically-small multiplicands.
Proof. (a) Server computes off-line the support of all 2n itemsets in the database D,
and stores them in a new database D0. Note that the database D0 contains 2n elements,
each len(m) bits. After that, Client and Server use the
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-CPIR protocol to retrieve
the Qth element of D0. Clearly, Client learns the support of Q, while Server obtains no
new knowledge. If we use an oblivious transfer protocol instead of a CPIR protocol,
then we get a server-private version of the CPIR-PISC protocol,
(b) Let S = S[1]...S[2n − 1] be Server’s (2n − 1)-bit input, and let i be Client’s
query in the
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-CPIR protocol. We construct a speciﬁc 2n × n binary database D
such that itemset supports in it encode S. More precisely, let χ(a) := (a1,...,an) be a
Boolean vector corresponding to the binary representation of a, that is, a =
P
2j−1aj.
The next algorithm builds a database D such that suppD(χ(a)) ≡ S[a] mod 2 for
every a ∈ {1,...,2n − 1}:
1. Initialise D as a 2n × n all-zero matrix.
2. For w = n downto 1 do
For all a s.t. the vector (a1,...,an) ∈ Zn
2 has Hamming weight w do
(a) Set v ← suppD(a1,...,an).
(b) If v 6≡ S[a] mod 2
then replace the ﬁrst all-zero row of D with (a1,...,an).
Since this algorithm considers itemsets in the order of decreasing cardinality, subse-
quent changes do not alter the already computed supports; thus, at the end all bits of S
are correctly encoded. Moreover, the number of replaced rows is not greater than 2n−1
and thus step 2b never fails to ﬁnd an all-zero row. It is straightforward to derive the
complexity bounds for this step.Let D be the ﬁnal version of this database. Now, when Client wants to make a
CPIR query i, he instead forms the corresponding PISC query Q := χ(i) and obtains
suppD(Q) by executing PISC. Then, he computes S[i] ← suppD(Q) mod 2. Clearly,
the client-privacy of PISC-CPIR follows directly from the client-privacy of the original
PISC protocol. u t
By using similar but more complicated techniques, one can directly construct an obliv-
ious transfer protocol based on a PISC protocol. In this case, the number of rows of the
database D is still polynomial w.r.t. the number of encoded bits.
Corollary 1. Assume that the Decisional Composite Residuosity Problem is hard. As-
sume that n = polylog(m). There exists a private (m × n)-PISC protocol CPIR-PISC
with communication Θ(n2 ·log2 |P|+n·len(m)) and Server’s online work Θ(2n ·m).
The use of a very recent
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-CPIR protocol by Gentry and Ramzan [GR05] would
result in communication Θ(n + len(m)).
As the communication complexity of non-private itemset support count is roughly
n + len(m), Corollary 1 provides an almost communication-optimal solution. On the
other hand, Thm. 2 indicates that any PISC protocol with optimal communication
O(n+logm) gives a rise to a
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-CPIR protocol with communication O(logs). More-
over, the known lower and upper bounds on the CPIR protocols can be used to get
lower and upper bounds for the (m×polylog(m))-PISC protocols. For example, given
a trapdoor permutation, there exists an (m × polylog(m))-PISC protocol with com-
munication m − o(m). On the other hand, an (m × polylog(m))-PISC protocol with
communication m − o(m) implies the existence of one-way functions.
4.2 Oblivious Keyword Search-Based PISC
As a serious drawback, note that CPIR-PISC is practical only for small values of n,
e.g., when n ≤ 20, as the pre-computation step becomes quickly infeasible. The same
applies for the CPIR step, as Server’s workload is at least linear in the size of database
in all CPIR protocols.
However, in speciﬁc settings the online complexity of CPIR can be drastically re-
duced. The ﬁrst efﬁcient protocol for oblivious keyword search was proposed by Ogata
and Kurosawa [OK04]; their approach was extended in [FIPR05]. In these two proto-
cols, during the ﬁrst phase Server transfers the whole database, in an encrypted form,
to Client. In the second phase, Client and Server invoke an oblivious pseudo-random
function evaluation protocol. As the result, Client obtains a secret key that allows her
to decrypt one database element. Though the initial communication of the protocol is
linear in the database size, the second phase has poly-logarithmic communication and
computation in the database size. Such a protocol is especially appealing if the second
phase are repeated many times as it is commonly done in data-mining algorithms.
Thm. 2 can be used to transform an oblivious keyword search protocol to a PISC
protocol. If one is interested in the frequencies of all different supports, then the re-
sulting protocol is not really practical since the transfered PISC database must have
2n elements. However, in data-mining applications, Client is often only interested inPRIVATE INPUT: Client has a query Q and Server has a database D.
PRIVATE OUTPUT: Client learns suppD(Q) if freqD(Q) ≥ σ.
Setup Phase
Server runs a frequent itemset mining algorithm that outputs F = {X : freqD(X) ≥ σ}.
Server chooses a secret key sk and for all X ∈ F computes Ei ← ObPrfsk(code(X)) ⊕
(0
`||suppD(X)).
Send list {Ei}, in a randomly permuted order, to Client.
Interactive Phase
Client and Server invoke ΠObPrf. At the end Client obtains mask ← ObPrfsk(code(X)).
Post-processing by Client
If there is an Ei such that Ei ⊕ mask = (0
`||c) then output c;
else decide that suppD(Q) < σ.
Protocol 2: Protocol for PISC based on oblivious pseudo-random function evaluation
the supports of frequent itemsets. In such a case, Server can ﬁrst run any conventional
frequent itemset mining algorithm on the database using an appropriate minimum fre-
quency threshold σ, and then encrypt supports of the obtained σ-frequent itemsets. In
practice, the minimum frequency threshold σ is chosen to be as low as possible, so that
the mining is still feasible, to get a good approximation of the supports of all itemsets.
Protocol 2 combines this idea with oblivious keyword search. This is relatively
straightforward, but we have included the protocol for the sake of completeness. To
read it, ﬁrst recall that a two-argument pseudo-random function ObPrf is an OPRF, if
it can be obliviously evaluated by Client and Server [FIPR05]. In other words, there
exist a secure protocol ΠObPrf such that after executing it on Client’s private input x
and Server’s private input sk, Client learns ObPrfsk(x), while Server learns nothing.
Second, we assume that each itemset Q has a short unique code code(Q), this can be a
cryptographic hash of Q.
Theorem 3. Let ObPrf be (τ,ε0
1) secure pseudo-random function with appropriate do-
mainandrange.LettheprotocolΠObPrf (τ,ε1)client-privateand(τ,ε0
2)server-private.
Then Protocol 2 is (τ,ε1)-client-private and (τ − O(1),ε0
1 + ε0
2)-server-private PISC
protocol. Protocol 2 yields an incorrect end-result with probability 2−` ·|F|. The inter-
active phase can be repeated over the same initially transformed encrypted database
with a linear drop in concrete security.
Proof (Sketch). We do not provide a complete proof, see [FIPR05] for details. Client-
privacy and correctness are evident. Server-privacy follows from the next hybrid argu-
ment. First, consider a protocol Π1, where ΠObPrf is substituted with its ideal implemen-
tation. Let Π2 be the protocol, where also ObPrf is substituted with a random function.
It is clear that Π2 is 0-server-private. The claim follows, since the protocols Π2 and Π1
are computationally ε0
1-close and Π1 and Protocol 2 are computationally ε0
2-close. u t
Ogata and Kurosawa used the RSA blinded signature to construct an ObPrf, i.e.,
there ObPrfsk(x) = Prf(BlindSignsk(x)) for a pseudo-random function Prf. However,
the Ogata-Kurosawa protocol is a priori secure only in the random-oracle model. Onthe other hand, their protocol has only two messages and Server’s actions are veriﬁable.
Indeed, any two-message server-veriﬁable ObPrf can be converted to a blind signature
scheme. Thus, the Ogata-Kurosawa construction is optimal in that sense. Freedman et
al [FIPR05] proposed an alternative OPRF construction that is secure in the standard
model under the Decisional Difﬁe-Hellman assumption. Unfortunately, their two-round
solution is not a priori server-veriﬁable; that is, Client cannot test whether the obtained
value is equal to ObPrfsk(x). Therefore, a malicious Server can mount undetectable
denial of service attacks by deviating from ΠObPrf.
If the OPRF is veriﬁable and the Setup phase is done correctly, then the whole
protocolisveriﬁable;thisissinceServercannotchangethecommittedvaluesEi.Asthe
Setup phase is relatively short and well-speciﬁed, its correctness can be guaranteed by
non-cryptographic methods. The later does not hold for query-transfer phase as queries
can arrive during a long time period.
Generally, Protocol 2 is well suited for static databases, where Server has to run
frequent itemsets mining algorithm rarely, say once in a month. Otherwise, the large
initial complexity over-weights its possible advantages.
4.3 On-line Computation with Subset Inclusion
As stated before, the pre-computation cost of CPIR-PISC protocol is too large even
in the case of the databases of moderate size. Limiting the answers only to frequent
itemsets, like in Sect. 4.2, extends the applicability of CPIR-PISC to larger databases
but limits the possible queries. To answer support queries also in large databases, we
give Protocol 3. In this protocol, Server does not perform any pre-computation. Instead,
when Server gets Client’s query as an encrypted binary vector (c1,...,cn), he runs a
private subset inclusion test (a version of Protocol 1 that is secure in the semi-honest
model) for every row of D, and ﬁnally returns the replies in a randomised order. As a
result, Client receives Dsk(Ci) = 0 for every row where Q was present and Dsk(Ci) is
random element of P for every row where Q was not present. After that, she decrypts
the results and then counts the number of nonzero values. Together with Protocol 1, the
communication of this protocol (in the semi-honest model) is (n + 1 + m) · len(|P|)
bits. (Note that here we implicitly need that |P| > n.) No off-line work is done; Client
performs Θ(n+m) and Server does Θ(w(D)+m) units of online computation, where
w(D) denotes the number of 1-s in the whole database. Again, in the data-mining sce-
narios, the database is usually very sparse and therefore w(D) is small.
Theorem 4. Let Π be (τ,ε) IND-CPA secure homomorphic cryptosystem. Then Pro-
tocol 3 is (τ − O(n),nε) client-private and 0-server-private in the semi-honest model.
Proof. As Server sees only n encryptions, client-privacy follows from standard hybrid
argument: any adversary A that can distinguish two vectors of ciphertexts can be used
for distinguishing only two ciphertexts. Simulation of Client’s view is straightforward,
the simulator must send suppD(Q) encryptions of 0’s and m−suppD(Q) encryptions
of random elements. u t
Security against malicious Clients is achieved by letting Client to prove in zero-
knowledge, for every i ∈ [n], that ci is an encryption of either 0 or 1. This is usually
feasible since in reality, n ≤ 100000.PRIVATE INPUT: Client has a set Q and Server has a database D.
PRIVATE OUTPUT: Client knows count = suppD(Q)
Message 1, Client Generate (sk,pk) ← G and send pk to Server.
For any i ∈ [n], send ci ← Epk(Q[i];ri) with ri ←r R to Server.
Message 2, Server Generate a random permutation π : [m] 7→ [m].
Set d ←
Qn
i=1 ci.
For every transaction j ∈ [m]
Draw sj ←r P and r
0
j ←r R uniformly at random.
Send Cj ← (d/
Q
i:D[π(j),i]=1 ci)
sj · Epk(0;r
0
j) to Client.
Post-processing by Client
Set count ← 0.
For every row j ∈ [m]
If Dsk(Cj) = 0 then count ← count + 1.
Return count.
Protocol 3: Protocol for PISC, based on the private inclusion test.
5 Imprecise Private Itemset Counting Protocols
In practice, it is not usually necessary to give exact supports but accurate approxima-
tions. Sometimes it is even sufﬁcient to know whether a set is frequent or not. In this
section, we consider two approaches to approximate frequency queries. First, we study
protocols to decide whether a given itemset is frequent or not. That gives rise to de-
terministic support approximation techniques. Second, we show how random sampling
can be used together with Protocol 3 to obtain support approximations with quality
guarantees.
5.1 Private frequent itemset detection
The simplest approximation of the support of a frequent itemset is to tell whether or
not the itemset is frequent. At the end of a private frequent itemset detection (PFID)
protocol, Client learns whether freqD(Q) ≥ σ, and nothing else. PFID is a common
subtask in pattern discovery [MT97,GKM+03]. Moreover, PFID can be used as sub-
protocol in different approximate PISC protocols.
One straightforward solution is to use Prot. 2 on a database where one stores some
ﬁxed integer instead of the cardinality of the support. However, this does not decrease
communication or computation signiﬁcantly.
A more interesting alternative is to modify the database so that it contains only max-
imal frequent sets, i.e., frequent sets that are not subsets of other frequent sets. That is,
every maximal frequent set is added to a new database D0 as a transaction. Afterwards,
Client and Sever execute a PISC protocol on D0. If suppD0(Q) ≥ 0, then Q is frequent
in the original database. Since the number of maximal itemsets can be exponentially
smaller than the number of frequent itemsets, this idea might give us a signiﬁcant win
in the practice. Note that instead of just the support of Q, the resulting protocol also
outputs both the number ` of maximal itemsets and the number k of maximal itemsetsthat contain Q. This additional information is sometimes desired in data mining. Even
if undesired, however, such a leak is not necessarily very dangerous for the privacy of
the database, since in practice there are always many different alternatives that could be
the collection of the ` maximal itemsets, k of them containing the itemset Q. Namely,
any anti-chain (i.e., a collection A such that (X ⊆ Y ∨ Y ⊆ X) ⇒ X = Y for all
X,Y ∈ A) of ` itemsets on the attributes of the database such that k of the itemsets
contain Q and ` − k do not contain Q could be that collection of maximal itemsets.
To show that the number of such possible collections of maximal itemsets is large,
we give a rough lower bound in the case the query contains less than n/2 elements
and there is no prior information on the database content. Let M be a collection of all
itemsets of cardinality bn/2c. Let cQ be the cardinality of {X ∈ M : Q ⊆ X} and c
cardinality of M, i.e. c =
  n
bn/2c

. Now, there is exactly
 cQ
k

ways to choose maximal
sets from M containing Q, and
 c−cQ
`−k

ways to choose other `−m elements that cannot
contain Q. Therefore, the lower bound on consistent conﬁgurations is huge,

cQ
k

c − cQ
` − k

=
  n−|Q|
bn/2c−|Q|

k
  n
bn/2c

−
  n−|Q|
bn/2c−|Q|

` − k

.
Furthermore, the exact numbers of maximal itemsets can be hidden by adding
adding some subsets of the maximal itemsets to the database. This does not change
the outcome of the protocol since if an itemset is contained in some subset of a maxi-
mal itemset, then it is obviously contained also in the maximal itemset itself. Note that
also the supports of the itemsets leak information about other itemsets and the under-
lying database since each acquired support further restricts the collection of databases
compatible with the known supports [Mie03].
A PFID protocol can be used to answer exact and approximate support queries.
Let 0 < σ1 < ··· < σk ≤ 1 be the minimum frequency thresholds for which the
frequent itemset detection problem can be solved. Then Client can ﬁnd out to which of
the intervals (0,mσ1],...,(mσk,m] the support of Q belongs. Note that there are at
most m different possible supports and in practice the number is often strictly smaller
than that.
5.2 Sampling
A randomly chosen subset of the transactions provides usually a very good summary
of the database. This is true also in the case of frequency estimation. Recall that the
frequency of an itemset in a transaction database is the fraction of the transactions
containing that itemset. Thus, the frequency of an itemset can be estimated from a
set of randomly chosen transactions. Furthermore, the relative and absolute errors of
such an estimation can be bounded by the Chernoff bound and the Hoeffding bound,
respectively. (Note that Protocol 3 can be applied as well to a randomly chosen subset
of transactions of the database as to the database itself.)
Let us assume for a moment that we know that the frequency of the itemset is at
least σ. In that case the Chernoff bound gives us the following bound for the relative
error ε:Theorem 5. Let S be a random k-row sample of an n-row database D
with replacement. Then Pr[(1 − ε)freqD(Q) ≤ freqS(Q) ≤ (1 + ε)freqD(Q)] ≤
2exp
 
−ε2kσ/4

, when the itemset is frequent, i.e. freqD(Q) ≥ σ.
Proof. Let IQ(S[i]) be IQ be an indicator variable, i.e. IQ(S[i]) = 1 if Q ⊆ S[i] and
0 otherwise. Then the frequency estimator freqS(Q) =
Pk
i=1 IQ(S[i])/k is a random
variable with the expectation E(freqS(Q)) = freqD(Q). As freqS(Q) is a sum of k
i.i.d. random zero-one variables and freqD(Q) ≥ σ by assumption, we can apply the
Chernoff bound and underestimate freqD(Q) by σ. This proves the claim. u t
Theorem 5 allows us to estimate the sufﬁcient number of transactions to bound the
relative error ε and the failure probability δ:
Corollary 2. To guarantee that the relative error is at most ε and the failure probability
is at most δ, it is sufﬁcient to randomly choose k ≥ 4(ln2/δ)/(ε2σ) transactions from
the database.
Moreover, if we are interested in bounding the absolute error, the number of rows
sufﬁcient to guarantee a certain error bound is even smaller without assuming anything
about the frequencies:
Theorem 6. Let S be a random k-row sample of an n-row database D with replace-
ment. Then Pr[|freqS(Q) − freqD(Q)| ≥ ε] ≤ 2exp
 
−2ε2k

.
Proof. As freqS(Q) is a sum of k i.i.d. random zero-one variables, we can apply the
Hoeffding bound which proves the claim. u t
The number of transaction sufﬁcient in this case is as follows:
Corollary 3. To guarantee that the relative error is at most ε and the failure probability
is at most δ, it is sufﬁcient to randomly choose k ≥ (ln2/δ)/(2ε2) transactions from
the database.
For example, with failure probability 10−3 and absolute error 1/100, it is sufﬁcient to
have 38500 rows in the sample and thus PSI-PISC protocol is efﬁcient enough. Hence,
the sampling technique provides an approximation protocol such that the computation
and communication complexity are independent from database size. The complexity
depends only on the desired approximation error ε and the failure probability δ.
The approximation error bounds given above can be used also to obtain approxima-
tions for the frequent itemset detection, i.e., property testers for itemsets being frequent.
More speciﬁcally, we can use the above bounds to decide correctly with high probabil-
ity whether the itemset is frequent or not when the correct frequency of the itemset is
above or below the minimum frequency threshold σ at least by error ε; if the correct
frequency is within the error ε from the minimum frequency threshold σ, we might
answer incorrectly with non-negligible probability.
Chernoff and Hoeffding bounds are quite tight when estimating the frequency of a
single itemset from one sample databases, i.e. we re-sample the database before each
query. This is not the case when several frequencies are estimated, i.e., when Server
generates a single database by sampling the transactions to answer all or many Client’squeries. In this case, Server might even verify the approximation precision of all fre-
quent itemsets F (or some other collection of itemsets of interest).
The straightforward generalisation of of the Hoeffding bound to a collection F of
itemsets with maximum absolute error guarantee ε for an arbitrary sequence of fre-
quency queries to F yields to sample complexity of (ln2|F|/δ)/(2ε2) [Toi96]. How-
ever, this is a worst-case bound. In practice, transaction databases are not as difﬁcult
to sample as possible but have a lot structure. One important measure of complexity of
a transaction database is its Vapnik-Chervonenkis dimension (VC-dimension) w.r.t. the
itemsets whose frequencies want to be able to estimate accurately. If the VC-dimension
is k, then the number of transactions is sufﬁcient to guarantee maximum absolute error
ε with probability 1 − δ is O(kln1/(δε)/ε2).
For example, the VC-dimension of the database w.r.t. frequent itemsets can be
bounded above by log|C|, where C is the collection of closed frequent itemsets in
the database [Mie04]. (An itemset is closed in collection F if its support is strictly
higher than the largest support of its supersets.) Using this upper bound for the Vapnik-
Chervonenkis dimension, it is possible to show that a sample of O(ln|C|ln1/(δε))/ε2
transactions sufﬁces to guarantee with failure probability δ that the maximum abso-
lute error is at most ε. As the number of closed frequent itemsets can be exponen-
tially smaller than the number of frequent itemsets, the VC-based sample bound can be
O(lnln|F|ln1/(δε))/ε2 at smallest. In practice, one can compute both the Hoeffding
bound and the VC-bound, and take the minimum of them. Also, if the collection of the
itemsets for which the approximation guarantees are required is small enough, then one
can maintain the frequency estimates for all itemsets of interest and stop the sampling
immediately when the frequency estimates are sufﬁciently accurate.
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